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Williamsport, PA 17701-0000

Frederick E. Martin, Esq. (Argued)
Office of United States Attorney
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McKee, Circuit Judge
Richard J. Stubler appeals his conviction and subsequent sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 115(a)(2). Those charges arose from his driving a kitchen knife into the side of his
former probation officer’s house. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I1 .
The prosecution and defense agreed to have Stubler enter a conditional guilty plea
and preserve his right to argue that the conduct he would admit to did not amount to a
violation of § 115(a)(2). In addition, the government agreed to make a non-binding
recommendation that Stubler’s sentence not exceed imprisonment for one year and one
day. However, the district court refused to accept the sentencing recommendation
because the court did not believe it complied with Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 11(a)(2).
Accordingly, Stubler waived his right to a jury trial and went to trial based on
stipulations of fact supplemented with limited testimony from an FBI agent and Stubler’s
former probation officer, Mel Hoover. The district court convicted Stubler. The advisory
guideline range for the offense, as calculated by the probation office, was 46-57 months.
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Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not set forth the factual or procedural background except insofar as may be helpful
to our brief discussion.
2

The district court granted a downward departure which reduced that range to 30-37
months imprisonment. After calculating the guideline range, the court sentenced Stubler
to 33 months imprisonment over defense counsel’s objection. This appeal followed.2
I.
Stubler argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Thus,
our review is “particularly deferential.” United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 175 (3d
Cir. 2002). “It is not our role to weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the
witnesses.” Id. Rather, “[w]e . . . view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and sustain the verdict if any rational juror could have found the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
Stubler also challenges the calculation of his sentence. To the extent that we
review the district court’s legal rulings or interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, our
review is plenary. United States v. Lennon, 372 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2004). However,
to the extent that the court’s selection of the appropriate offense level under the
guidelines is based upon findings of fact, the district court is entitled to deference.
Cothran, 286 F.3d 177.
II.
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2), makes it a crime to “threaten[] . . . [a Federal law
enforcement officer] . . . with intent to retaliate . . . on account of the performance of
official duties . . . ”. Stubler argues that the evidence does not support his conviction
because he did not intend to retaliate against Hoover or threaten him. Rather, he claims
he made a “snap decision” to stab Hoover’s house out of frustration. He also argues that
his conduct could not have been “on account of performance of official duties” because
his term of supervision with Hoover had ended approximately eight years earlier. We can
not agree with either contention.
Stubler’s supervised release ended in April of 1997, and all agree that Hoover was
not involved in any surveillance of Stubler’s home, nor was Hoover supervising Stubler.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Stubler was angry with “the government” and he considered
Hoover to be an agent of the government. Given our limited standard of review, that is
sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Stubler thrust a knife into
Hoover’s house because Stubler believed he was under government surveillance and
either blamed Hoover, or faulted Hoover for not intervening to stop the perceived
intrusion. We believe that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Stubler’s conduct
was therefore “on account of” Hoover’s official duties within the meaning of § 115(a)(2).
Similarly, we must reject Stubler’s claim that he acted impulsively on a “spur of
the moment” impulse rather than out of a retaliatory motive. We realize that Stubler used
a weapon more closely associated with meatloaf than mayhem, but that does not negate
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the fact he was armed with a knife when he traveled across town to visit Hoover. That
suggests advance planning and intent. Similarly, although we see no reason to doubt
Stubler’s statements that he actually liked Hoover and would not have hurt him, Stubler
also stated that he was “angry with” Hoover and “wanted to scare him.” That is sufficient
for a reasonable fact finder to infer the required retaliatory intent.
III.
Stubler also argues that the district court erred in categorizing him as a Career
Offender under the Guidelines. The two prior reckless endangerment convictions the
court relied on appear from the sentencing transcript to be related to Stubler’s driving.
The district court concluded those convictions constituted past crimes of violence for
purposes of classifying Stubler a Career Offender. The Sentencing Guidelines define a
“crime of violence” as follows:
(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under
federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that –
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added).
While we are sympathetic to Stubler’s argument that reckless endangerment
offenses should not be considered “crimes of violence,” Stubler’s argument is foreclosed
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by our decision in United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992).3 There, we
questioned the wisdom of the possibly inadvertent adoption of a definition for “crime of
violence” that can include offenses that do not involve the intentional use of force. Id. at
860-61, 874-75. However, neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission has seen fit
to revise that definition.
Moreover, Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2005) and Singh v. Gonzales,
432 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2006) do not help Stubler. There, we had to determine what
qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of convictions for “aggravated” felonies
under immigration law. Our analysis was governed by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). In 1989, the
Guidelines were revised and no longer track 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). In fact, the panel in Tran
v. Gonzales explicitly reconciled its decision with Parson, but did not overrule it.4 414
F.3d at 470 n.5.
IV.
Stubler claims the district court should have used U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3 (“Minor
Assault”) with a base offense level that does not exceed 7 rather than U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1,
(“Threatening or Harassing Communications; Hoaxes”) with a base offense level of 12.
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The district court did grant a downward departure because the guideline
calculation overstated the seriousness of Stubler’s prior record.
4

United States v. Otero is similarly distinguishable because it addressed a different
section of the Guidelines that contains its own definition of crime of violence. 502 F.3d
331 (3d Cir. 2007).
6

Appendix A lists several possible base offense sections which could apply to a violation
of § 115 including § 2A6.1. Accordingly, the court did not err in selecting § 2A6.1.
V.
Stubler next argues that the district court should not have applied a 6-level
enhancement to his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 based on the victim
being a former federal employee, because Hoover’s status as a federal employee “is
counted once as an essential element of the crime of conviction and counted a second
time by application of the enhancement.” We have already rejected that argument. See
United States v. Green, 25 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1994).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court committed no legal error in
convicting or sentencing Stubler. Nevertheless, we feel compelled to express our concern
about the sentence imposed here. Stubler has a history of paranoid schizophrenia and all
concerned agree that he suffers from a very profound mental illness. All concerned also
agree that Stubler generally had a good relationship with Hoover, and that Stubler’s
mental illness rather than malice or a predisposition towards violence led to this
transgression.
Neither the government nor the victim wanted Stubler to receive a sentence of
more than a year and a day, which would have been tantamount to a “time served”
sentence. We assume that all would agree that prison is not the most effective
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environment for the treatment of mental illness. Accordingly, a shorter sentence could
have allowed Stubler to receive the mental health treatment he so desperately needed. It
also would have been more consistent with the command of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that
courts impose the minimum sentence necessary to comply with the sentencing objectives
that must be considered.
The reasonableness of that sentence is not before us. Nevertheless, it is difficult
for us not to conclude that the district court could have reasonably exercised its discretion
to impose a sentence more consistent with treatment of the mental health aspects of
Stubler’s behavior rather than imposing the sentence it selected.
Although we are not privy to all of the dynamics and factors that went into this
prosecution, it certainly appears that this entire matter could have been handled much
more appropriately by the mental health system rather than the criminal justice system.
That is, of course, “water under the bridge.” Stubler’s transgression has now been
prosecuted as a criminal matter, a criminal conviction has been obtained, and a sentence
imposed. It is indeed regrettable that state and federal authorities could not have
cooperated in a manner that would have resolved this regrettable incident in the mental
heath system where it belongs.
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